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Abstract 
Can purely psychological trauma lead to a complete blockage of autobiographical memories? 
This longstanding question about the existence of repressed memories has been at the heart of 
one of the most heated debates in modern psychology. These so-called memory wars originated 
in the 1990s and many scholars have assumed that they are over. We demonstrate that this 
assumption is incorrect and that the controversial issue of repressed memories is alive and well 
and may even be on the rise. We review converging research and data from legal cases indicating 
that the topic of repressed memories remains active in clinical, legal, and academic settings. We 
show that the belief in repressed memories occurs on a non-trivial-scale (58%) and appears to 
have increased among clinical psychologists since the 1990s. We also demonstrate that the 
scientifically controversial concept of dissociative amnesia, which we argue is a substitute term 
for memory repression, has gained in popularity.  Finally, we review work on the adverse side 
effects of certain psychotherapeutic techniques, some of which may be linked to the recovery of 
repressed memories. The memory wars have not vanished: They have continued to endure and 
contribute to potentially damaging consequences in clinical, legal, and academic contexts.  
 
Keywords: Memory Wars; Repressed Memory; Repression; False Memory; Recovered Memory; 
Therapy 
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"The past is never dead. It’s not even past". 
William Faulkner 
 
The Return of the Repressed:  
The Persistent and Problematic Claims of Long-Forgotten Trauma 
 
More than 20 years ago, Crews (1995) coined the term “memory wars” to refer to a 
contentious debate regarding the existence of repressed memories which refers to memories that 
become inaccessible for conscious inspection due to an active process called repression. This 
debate raged throughout the 1990s and was widely assumed to have passed its peak in the new 
millennium. A number of prominent authors who were skeptical of repressed memories (e.g., 
Barden, 2016; McHugh, 2003; Paris, 2012) declared the memory wars to be effectively over, 
essentially arguing that most researchers and clinicians now understand that believing in such 
memories without reservation is at best questionable scientifically. The argument among these 
authors is essentially that the recovered memory skeptics won. Others argue that the memory 
wars has been resolved in the opposite direction, stating that there is now better evidence for a 
trauma-dissociation model, and less room for a skeptic stance towards repressed (dissociated; see 
below) memories (Dalenberg et al., 2012). Some proponents of the idea of dissociative amnesia 
(i.e., inability to remember autobiographic experiences usually due to trauma) have even likened 
skeptics to climate science deniers (Brand et al., 2018; in response to Merckelbach & Patihis, 
2018). Their argument appears to be that they have won the memory wars, and further proof of 
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this is the continued inclusion of dissociative amnesia in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013; see also 
Spiegel et al., 2011).  
In this article, we present evidence that the debate concerning repressed memories is by 
no means dead. To the contrary, we contend that it rages on today and that the term dissociative 
amnesia is being used as a substitute term for repressed memory. To buttress this point, we will 
present converging lines of evidence from several sources suggesting that the concept of 
repressed memories has not vanished and that it has merely re-appeared in numerous guises, for 
example in the context of dissociative amnesia. Admittedly, some researchers have argued that 
the memory wars have persisted (e.g., Patihis, Ho, Tingen, Lilienfeld, & Loftus, 2014), but no 
review has systematically and critically evaluated this proposition. In this article, we amass 
evidence from multiple sources showing that beliefs associated with repressed memories and 
related topics such as dissociative amnesia, far from being extinguished as claimed by some 
scholars, remain very much alive today. Furthermore, we intend to demonstrate that these beliefs 
carry significant risks in clinical and legal settings.  
Repressed Memories and the Memory Wars 
 As Ellenberger (1970) explained in his classic monograph, the concept of repressed 
memories traces its roots to the psychoanalytic theory and practice of Sigmund Freud, who in 
turn was influenced by physician-hypnotists, such as Jean-Martin Charcot, in the final decades of 
the nineteenth century. At the heart of this concept is the idea that traumatic experiences are 
often so overwhelming that people use defense mechanisms to cope with them. One of these 
mechanisms involves the automatic and unconscious repression of the traumatic memory with 
the consequence that people no longer recollect or retain awareness of the experience that 
triggered it (e.g., Loftus, 1993; McNally, 2005; Piper, Lillevik, & Kritzer, 2008). Nevertheless, 
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according to this view, the repressed trauma ostensibly exacts a serious mental and physical toll 
(Hornstein, 1992), manifesting itself psychologically and somatically in a wide array of 
symptoms (e.g., fainting, amnesia, mutism). This influential “body keeps the score” hypothesis 
implies that trauma can be “entirely organized on an implicit or perceptual level, without an 
accompanying narrative about what happened” (Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995, p. 512). The goal 
of therapy is thus to make the implicit—the repressed—explicit (Yapko, 1994), echoing Freud’s 
(1923) famous tenet that psychoanalysis aims to make the unconscious conscious. Thus, the 
notion of repressed memories encompasses three ideas: (a) people repress traumatic experiences, 
(b) the repressed content has psychopathological potential, and (c) recovering traumatic content 
is necessary for engendering symptom relief.  
 In the 1990s, as we will soon demonstrate in a review of data of surveyed clinicians, the 
belief in repressed memories was endemic in therapeutic circles. Even when patients did not 
recollect the trauma, such as sexual abuse, some therapists suggested that their unconscious may 
harbor repressed memories. When clients presented with symptoms of, for example, anxiety, 
mood, personality, or eating disorders, many clinicians seemed to take these symptoms as signs 
of long-repressed memories of abuse. Furthermore, in the 1990s, dream interpretation, hypnosis, 
guided imagery, repeated cuing of memories, and diary methods, among other recovered 
memory techniques, were used by many practitioners to ostensibly uncover repressed memories 
and bring them to the surface of consciousness. Due to these treatments, patients started to 
recover purported memories of abuse, typically sexual abuse, and some filed criminal or civil 
suits against their alleged perpetrator (Loftus, 1994; Loftus & Ketcham, 1996).  
 During these therapeutic interventions, suggestive techniques were commonly employed 
to recover the alleged repressed memory. At that time, laboratory research began to show the 
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deleterious effects of suggestion on autobiographical recollections of childhood episodes. In one 
of the first such studies, Loftus and Pickrell (1995) asked students to report on four events that 
happened in their childhood. One event was fabricated, involving being lost in a shopping mall at 
about 5 years old. Students were told that their parents provided these narratives to the 
experimenters, while in fact, parents had confirmed that the event did not happen. After three 
suggestive interviews, 25% (n = 6) of the participants claimed that the false event in fact 
occurred.  This and other studies during the 1990s indicated that false autobiographical 
memories1 can be implanted with suggestive interviewing techniques (e.g., Hyman, Husband, & 
Billings, 1995; for earlier relevant work, see Laurence & Perry, 1983; for a review of false 
memories before 1980, see Patihis & Younes Burton, 2015).  
Based on this research, many memory researchers argued that repressed memories 
recovered in therapy may not be based on true events but could be false memories (Lindsay & 
Read, 1995; Loftus & Davis, 2006). An additional scenario offered by researchers is that some 
people may reinterpret childhood events as a result of therapy and come to experience this 
reinterpretation as memory recovery of abuse (McNally, 2012). For example, Schooler (2001) 
argued that individuals may initially not experience their abuse as traumatic, but later come to re-
evaluate it in this fashion. This change in meta-awareness may be experienced as a recovery of a 
memory when it instead comprises a new interpretation of a memory that was accessible all 
along. Schooler offered several case descriptions suggestive of this intriguing process, but 
strictly speaking it does not involve the re-emergence of repressed memories into consciousness. 
                                                
1 We use the term false memory in the present paper to refer to the remembrance of 
events/details that did not occur (e.g., Loftus, 2005).  
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Nevertheless, the reinterpretation account may be a plausible explanation of certain recovered 
memories of events that were genuinely experienced. 
Still, not all cases that were described by Schooler (2001) can be interpreted in terms of 
re-evaluation. Wagenaar (2005), for example, noted the inherent problems that such descriptions 
have to demonstrate the existence of recovered memories. He criticized Schooler’s (2001) case 
descriptions on the grounds that many assumptions needed to be met to confirm the existence of 
recovered memories in these cases. For example, Wagenaar observed that alleged victims 
sometimes received therapy, which might have influenced their memories. Also, Wagenaar noted 
that claiming to have forgotten sexual abuse is not the same as having forgotten the abuse. 
Apart from suggestive techniques that might lead to the creation of memory aberrations, 
some memory researchers noted that the concept of repressed memories is difficult to reconcile 
with studies on the effects of trauma on memory. Specifically, a large body of data suggest that 
the central aspects of trauma tend to be relatively well remembered (McNally, 2005). Several 
authors concluded that complete memory loss for traumatic events is rare among trauma victims, 
such as Holocaust survivors (Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1990), survivors of Japanese 
concentration camps (Merckelbach, Dekkers, Wessel, & Roefs, 2003), and victims of sexual 
abuse (Goodman et al., 2003). Furthermore, the idea of repressed memories runs counter to well-
established principles of human memory. For example, purported repressed memories are often 
about repeated experiences of abuse, but repeated events are generally well recollected. Also, 
people with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder frequently experience flashbacks and intrusive 
memories of the trauma and hence, do not typically report repressed memories, at least of their 
triggering traumatic event.  In addition, the idea of apparent recovered memories suggests that 
experiences can be forgotten and “recovered” following retrieval cues. This common memory 
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phenomenon does not require the idea of repressed memories (for an overview, see Roediger & 
Bergman, 1998). 
Recovery of mundane childhood memories is a perfectly normal phenomenon, although 
people may find it difficult to estimate how long they have not thought about a childhood 
experience (Parks, 1999). Recovery of a purportedly long forgotten trauma is less plausible in the 
light of everything that we know about traumatic memories (cf. supra), and in such cases the 
question arises whether there is independent evidence to corroborate the memory. Thus, a central 
issue concerning recovered memories is whether they can be independently corroborated. Studies 
examining corroborative evidence of recovered memories are often limited as they relied 
exclusively on victims’ characterization of corroboration (e.g., Chu, Frey, Ganzel, & Matthews, 
1999; Herman & Harvey, 1997). Research in which at least partial independent corroboration has 
been sought demonstrated that continuous memories of child sexual abuse recalled outside 
therapy were more often corroborated than discontinued memories of abuse recovered in therapy 
(Geraerts, Schooler, Merckelbach, Jelicic, Hauer, & Ambader, 2007; see also McNally, Perlman, 
Ristuccia, & Clancy, 2006). Another key point concerning recovered memories is that people 
may not think about the abuse for many years or forget their previous recollections of their 
traumatic experience. Such people might then spontaneously recover memories of abuse when 
reminded about the abuse outside of therapy. However, such a phenomenon, psychologically 
important as is, is a far cry from repressing a richly detailed memory in its entirety and later 
recalling it in therapy or everyday life (McNally & Geraerts, 2009). 
One way to examine how clinicians think about the reality of repressed memories is to 
survey them about their beliefs on the topic, and on their technical knowledge of how memory 
works. In this respect, a summary of practitioner survey studies since the 1990s is informative.    
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Memory Beliefs about Repressed Memories: From Then to Now 
Beliefs among Clinical Psychologists. Scientific interest in what therapists and other 
mental health professionals know about the functioning of memory originated because incorrect 
beliefs about memory could catalyze suggestive clinical practices and flawed treatment plans 
(Gore-Felton et al., 2000). Yapko (1994a, 1994b) conducted one of the first surveys of memory 
beliefs of psychology professionals. He found that 34% (n = 190) of masters-level 
psychotherapists and 23% (n = 48) of Ph.D. psychotherapists agreed that traumatic memories 
uncovered via hypnosis are authentic. Moreover, 59% (n = 513) of clinicians agreed that “events 
that we know occurred but can’t remember are repressed memories” (p. 231; Yapko, 1994a). 
Yapko (1994a) also found that 49% (n = 419) agreed that “memory is a reliable mechanism 
when the self-defensive need for repression is lifted” (p. 232). Dammeyer, Nightingale, and 
McCoy (1997) found 58% (n = 64) of Ph.D.-level clinicians, 71% (n = 74) of Psy.D-level 
clinicians, and 60% (n = 43) of M.S.W.-level clinicians agreed that repressed memories are 
genuine.` Merckelbach and Wessel (1998) detected an even higher percentage: 96% percent (n = 
25) of licensed psychotherapists endorsed the view that “repressed memories exist”. Poole et al. 
(1995; Survey 2) found that 71% (n = 37) of clinical psychologists reported that they had 
encountered at least one case of a recovered memory (see also Polusny & Follette, 1996).  
These studies were performed in the 1990s, which is considered to be the zenith of 
interest in repressed memories. After that period, a wealth of research published in 
psychological, psychiatric, and more legally oriented journals concluded that the notion of 
repressed memories is a highly problematic concept, particularly in the courts (Loftus, 2003; 
McNally, 2005; Piper et al., 2008; Porter et al., 2003; Rofe, 2008; Takarangi et al., 2008). 
Despite these critical papers, many psychologists, especially clinical and counseling 
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psychologists, continue to harbor the idea that traumatic memories can be buried for years or 
decades in the unconscious and later recovered. Magnussen and Melinder (2012) surveyed 
licensed psychologists and found that 63% (n = 540) believed recovered memories to be “real.” 
Kemp, Spilling, Hughes, and de Pauw (2013) demonstrated that 89% (n = 333) of surveyed 
clinical psychologists believed that memories for childhood trauma (such as sexual abuse) can be 
“blocked out” for many years. Patihis, Ho, Tingen, Lilienfeld, and Loftus (2014) found that 
60.3% (n = 35) of clinical practitioners and 69.1% (n = 56) of psychoanalysts agreed that 
traumatic memories are often repressed. Kagee and Breet (2015) found that 75.7% (n = 78) of 
103 South African psychologists responded probably or definitely true to the statement that 
“individuals commonly repress the memories of traumatic experiences” (Kagee & Breet, 2015, 
p. 5)  
Ost, Easton, Hope, French, and Wright (2017) showed that 69.6% (n = 87) of clinical 
psychologists strongly endorsed the belief that “the mind is capable of unconsciously ‘blocking 
out’ memories of traumatic events” (p. 60).  Recently, Wessel (2018) examined memory beliefs 
among Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) practitioners. EMDR is 
thought to be effective in making traumatic memories less vivid and emotionally negative (Lee 
& Cuijpers, 2013). Wessel asked EMDR practitioners whether access to traumatic memories can 
be blocked and found that 93% (n = 457) endorsed this statement.  
Beliefs among Other Professionals. Researchers have surveyed other professionals for 
whom it would be important to possess accurate knowledge concerning memory. Many of these 
studies did not specifically ask about professionals’ beliefs concerning the existence of repressed 
memories, but instead asked about issues related to eyewitness memory (e.g., confidence-
accuracy relationship; e.g., Magnussen, Melinder, Stridbeck, & Raja, 2010). Exceptions to this 
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trend include the study by Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, and Bradshaw (2006). In an 
American sample, they demonstrated that 73% (n = 81) of jurors, 50% (n = 21) of judges, and 
65% (n = 34) of law enforcement personnel believed in long-term repressed memories. Odinot, 
Boon, and Wolters (2015) asked Dutch police interviewers about whether traumatic memories 
can be repressed. They found that 75.7% (n = 108) agreed that they could. In a recent study, 84% 
(n = 133) of Dutch child protection workers indicated that traumatic memories are often 
repressed (Erens, Otgaar, Patihis, & De Ruiter, 2019).  
Beliefs among Laypersons. Laypeople such as undergraduates have also been asked in a 
number of studies to indicate their levels of belief concerning the existence of repressed 
memories (Lynn, Evans, Laurence, & Lilienfeld, 2015). Golding, Sanchez, and Sego (1996) 
reported that (a) 89% of 613 undergraduates were familiar with a circumstance in which 
someone recovered a repressed memory, (b) 75% of the latter students noted that the source of 
this information was television, and (c) belief in repressed memories was positively correlated 
with the amount of media exposure.  Merckelbach and Wessel (1998) found that 94% (n = 47) of 
students endorsed the idea that repressed memories exist. Magnussen and colleagues (2006) 
surveyed 2000 Norwegian people from the general public. They found that 45% (n = 900) of 
respondents believed that traumatic memories can be repressed. Strikingly, 40% (n = 800) 
believed that people who committed a murder can repress the memory of that event. Finally, 
Patihis et al. (2014) found that 81% (n = 316) of undergraduates believed that traumatic 
memories are often repressed. 
Based on these survey data, we calculated the overall percentage of people who believe 
in the existence of repressed memories in the combined samples (see Table 1). Although caution 
needs to be exerted when collapsing data across such surveys because the samples may vary on 
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many dimensions, aggregated data can be informative given they can generally be expected to 
cancel out largely random differences in participant characteristics. On average, 58% (n = 4745) 
of those who were surveyed indicated some degree of belief in the existence of repressed 
memories. When we examined the prevalence of these beliefs across subgroups within the 
combined sample, interesting results emerged. Among clinical psychologists, 70% (n = 2305) 
believed in the existence of repressed memories. This percentage was somewhat lower in the 
1990s (61%; n = 719) and increased to 76% (n = 1586) from 2010 onwards. Furthermore, 75% 
(n = 377) of other professionals expressed strong belief in repressed memories as did 46% (n = 
2063) of laypersons.  
We also performed additional analyses. For example, when we focused only on survey 
items using the word “repression”, we found a prevalence of 65% (n = 1265) in the belief of 
repressed memories. Also, because the items used differed to some extent among survey studies, 
we concentrated on statements for which people were asked specifically about the frequency of 
repressed memories (e.g., “Traumatic memories are often repressed”). When we focused on 
these statements (Erens, 2019; Kagee & Breet, 2015; Patihis et al., 2014), we found that 78% (n 
= 618) of surveyed people believed that traumatic experiences are often repressed. We also 
compared the rates of belief in repressed memories in the 1990s with those of all studies 
performed after the 1990s. A prevalence of 62% (n = 766) was observed for studies in the 1990s; 
this rate was slightly lower for studies performed after the 1990s (57%; n = 3979).  
Taken together, our data suggest, perhaps surprisingly, that mental health professionals in 
our combined samples were not more critical about repressed memories than were laypeople. 
This finding underscores our argument that a belief in repressed memories is deeply rooted in 
Modern Western societies. Moreover, the data suggest that despite a plethora of scientific work 
RETURN OF THE REPRESSED  13 
 
 
calling the existence of repressed memories into question (e.g., Loftus & Davis, 2006), clinical 
psychologists’, other mental health professionals’, and the general public’s views on repressed 
memories remain strong. Furthermore, it even seems that belief in repressed memories increased 
within clinical psychologists.  
Still, in certain groups of professionals, notably those working in legal psychology, 
skepticism regarding repressed memories is high. For example, Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, and 
Memon (2001) found that 22% of experts opined that repressed memories are “reliable enough” 
to present as evidence in the courtroom. Similarly, some recent research suggests that memory 
scientists tend to harbor strong reservations concerning the existence of repressed memories 
(with only 12.5% agreeing that repressed memories can be retrieved in therapy accurately; and 
27.2% of experimental psychologists agreeing to some extent that traumatic memories are often 
repressed; Patihis, Ho, Loftus, & Herrera, in press). It is important to emphasize that many 
informed scientists are skeptical: It counters the argument that repressed memories must exist 
because so many people believe in them, a tempting logical error termed the bandwagon fallacy 
(Briggs, 2014).  
Many of these surveys relied on the terms repression or repressed memories. These terms 
may have all kinds of connotations, leading to artificially raised endorsement patterns suggestive 
of belief in repressed memories. Brewin et al. (in press; Study 3) recently argued that high 
endorsement rates in the belief in repressed memories (to the statement: “Traumatic experiences 
can be repressed for many years and then recovered”) actually reflect a belief in conscious 
memory suppression (see section below on Retrieval Inhibition). They found that when members 
of the general public were also asked about their belief in conscious repression, similar 
endorsement rates were found as when they were questioned regarding repressed memories 
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(“Traumatic experiences can be repressed for many years and then recovered”). However, 
because Brewin and colleagues did not include a survey item on unconscious repression, it is 
unknown which endorsement rates would be detected for such controversial statement. To 
remedy this omission, Otgaar and colleagues (2019) specifically inquired about people’s belief in 
unconscious repression. They found high endorsement rates for both the belief in conscious and 
unconscious repression (around 60%), implying that the belief in repressed memories is still 
widespread. In what follows, we will show that as is true for the belief in repressed memories, 
dissociative amnesia, a conceptual twin of repression, has been deeply embedded into 
psychology lore in such a way that it could be the most potent threat to extend the memory wars. 
Dissociative Amnesia = Repressed Memories?  
 Despite the widespread belief in repressed memory, the term repression became 
controversial in the memory wars, and is now seldom used in a credible context in scientific 
publications. After the concept became intensely controversial, many clinicians adopted a new 
and perhaps more palatable term, “dissociative amnesia.”  This term became the preferred and 
more widely used appellation to refer to the process whereby traumas are rendered inaccessible.  
For example, dissociative amnesia is mentioned in the current edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013), whereas “repressed 
memory” or “repression” is not.  
There might be several reasons for why dissociative amnesia is listed in the DSM-5. One 
likely reason is that the substantial majority of the Task Force members of the DSM 5 were 
psychiatrists rather than psychologists, and the Task Force did not include memory experts (see 
Yan, 2007). Nor did this Task Force adequately reflect the full range of scientific opinions 
regarding the empirical status of dissociative disorders, including dissociative amnesia. Indeed, 
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as Lilienfeld, Watts, and Smith (2012, p.831) noted: “it is troubling that the DSM-5 Anxiety, 
Obsessive-Compulsive Spectrum, Posttraumatic, and Dissociative Disorders Work Group 
contains no members who have expressed doubts in scholarly outlets regarding the etiology of 
dissociative identity disorder and related dissociative disorders (e.g., dissociative amnesia, 
dissociative fugue), despite the fact that these disorders are exceedingly controversial in the 
scientific community (see Lynn et al., 2012)”. Also, case studies of patients claiming dissociative 
amnesia have figured prominently in the clinical literature, in turn perhaps contributing to the 
prima facie validity of the construct of dissociative amnesia (e.g., Staniloiu, Markowitsch, & 
Kordon, 2018).  
We propose that during and after the 1990s, when the term “repressed memory” was 
widely criticized, proponents began to favor the term dissociative amnesia instead. Perhaps 
Holmes (1994) was one of the first to notice this trend in 1994, when he noted that:  
“In the absence of good laboratory or clinical evidence for repression, proponents of the 
concept have begun to emphasize dissociation instead. But that is simply another name 
for repression; if one dissociates oneself from an event (is no longer aware of it), one has 
repressed it. Dissociative amnesia is supposed to occur after certain traumatic 
experiences. Yet alleged cases of this phenomenon are very rare” (p. 18).  
Consistent with this idea, dissociative amnesia was not mentioned in pre-1990s work on 
repression by Holmes (1972, 1974; Holmes & Schallow, 1969). This subtle but significant name 
change has muddied the waters and provided a cover for the continued practice of psychotherapy 
that involves repressed memories, albeit under new terminology.  
Dissociative amnesia is defined in the DSM-5 as the “inability to recall autobiographical 
information” that (a) is “usually of a traumatic or stressful nature,” (b) is “inconsistent with 
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ordinary forgetting,” (c) should be “successfully stored,” (d) involves a period of time when 
there is an “inability to recall,” (e) is not caused by “a substance” or “neurological … condition,” 
and (f) is “always potentially reversible because the memory has been successfully stored,” 
(APA, 2013; p. 298). These defining features serve as an umbrella set of criteria for three types 
of dissociative amnesia listed in DSM-5. Localized dissociative amnesia applies to memory loss 
for a “circumscribed period of time” and may be broader than amnesia for a single traumatic 
event, for example “months or years associated with child abuse” (p. 298). Because localized 
dissociative amnesia most resembles what was formerly called repressed memory, it is 
noteworthy that the DSM-5 calls this type “the most common form of dissociative amnesia.” In 
selective dissociative amnesia, the individual “can recall some, but not all, of the events during a 
circumscribed period of time” (p. 298). Generalized dissociative amnesia involves “a complete 
loss of memory for one's life history” and “is rare” (p. 298). The DSM-5 indicates “histories of 
trauma, child abuse, and victimization” as features that support a diagnosis of dissociative 
amnesia (p. 299).  
 Although dissociative symptoms in itself can manifest in contexts quite different from 
trauma (e.g., following ingestion or administration of the anesthetic ketamine (Simeon, 2004), 
3,4 MDMA, cannabis, and cocaine (Van Heugten-van der Kloet et al., 2015), Table 2 illustrates 
similarities in the definitions of dissociative amnesia from the DSM-5 (left column) and 
definitions advanced by scientific skeptics of repressed memory (middle column: wordings from 
Loftus, 1993; right column: from Holmes, 1974). We contend that based on striking parallels in 
definitions, skeptical arguments against repressed memories should apply with equal force to 
dissociative amnesia. More specifically, both dissociative amnesia and repressed memory 
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definitions share the idea that traumatic or upsetting material is stored, becomes inaccessible 
because of the trauma, and can later be retrieved in intact form.   
Table 2 
Side by Side Comparisons of the Definitions of Dissociative Amnesia and Repressed Memory  
Dissociative Amnesia  
from DSM-5 (APA, 2013; p. 298) 
Repressed memory  
from Loftus (1993; p. 518) 
Repression  
from Holmes (1974; p. 
632–633) 
“inability to recall autobiographical 
information” 
[implied indirectly in 
quotes] 
“repression is a loss [of 
memory] which…” 
“usually of a traumatic or stressful 
nature, that is inconsistent with 
ordinary forgetting,” 
“something happens that is 
so shocking…”” 
“…is specifically designed 
to selectively 
eliminate from 
consciousness those 
memories which cause 
the individual [affective] 
pain” 
“…rather than being a 
general loss due to simple 
decay” 
“and that it should be successfully 
stored,” 
“…that the mind grabs 
hold of the memory and 
pushes it underground,” 
“material which is 
repressed is not lost but 
rather stored in the 
unconscious” 
“involves a period of time when 
there is an “inability to recall,” 
“into some inaccessible 
corner of the unconscious. 
There it sleeps for years, or 
even decades, or even 
forever isolated from the 
rest of mental life” 
[implied indirectly in 
quotes] 
not caused by “a substance” or 
“neurological… condition,” 
[implied indirectly] 
Implied cause: an event 
“that is so shocking” 
[implied indirectly] 
Implied cause: “repression 
is a process motivated by a 
need to avoid the 
disturbing affect associated 
with certain memories”] 
“always potentially reversible 
because the memory has been 
successfully stored,” 
“Then, one day, it may rise 
up and emerge into 
consciousness 
“the material can return to 
consciousness 
without having to go 
through the process of 
being relearned.” 
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Although repressed memory as a concept is rarely defended in scientific circles these 
days, the idea of dissociative amnesia has become popular, especially in some psychiatric 
quarters. To illustrate this, for example, the Journal of Trauma & Dissociation has published in 
the years 2010-2019 71 papers related to dissociative amnesia, while zero papers were published 
on dissociative amnesia in the years 1990-1999.2 This ascension appears to be a major reason for 
the revitalization of the memory wars and for the continuation of therapies that attempt to 
exhume traumatic memories. In the first two editions of the influential DSM (APA, 1952; II: 
1968), neither dissociative nor psychogenic amnesia were listed or mentioned, although 
dissociative types of neurosis were. “Psychogenic amnesia” first appeared in the DSM-III (APA, 
1980; mentioned 19 times). “Dissociative amnesia” appeared for the first time in the DSM-IV 
(APA, 1994; appearing 50 times). In the latest version, the DSM-5, “dissociative amnesia” 
appeared 75 times (DSM-5; APA, 2013). Interestingly, in no edition of the DSM have the words 
“repress,” “repressed memory,” or “repression” been used.   
The DSM has codified and widely disseminated the concept of dissociative amnesia. In 
some quarters of psychology and psychiatry, dissociative amnesia is apparently taken as a valid 
and totally unproblematic concept (with notable exceptions: see Pope et al., 2007). Nevertheless, 
the definition of dissociative amnesia is scientifically fraught in many respects, just as is 
repressed memory. There are inherent problems when trying to ascertain whether a trauma has 
been stored but is nevertheless inaccessible. First, there is the complex problem of lack of 
falsifiability: The only way we can determine whether a memory was stored is by memorial 
report, but a memorial report instantly disproves the claim that the memory is inaccessible. 
                                                
2 On the website of the Journal of Trauma & Dissociation, we looked for papers using the search 
term “dissociative amnesia” in the range January 2010-May 2019 and in the range January 1990-
May 1999 
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Second, there is a difficulty in testing, or falsifying, whether psychological trauma is the reason 
why an event is not remembered. How this is established depends in part on the theoretical 
orientation of the psychologist and whether she or he interprets an inability to recall as due to 
psychogenic trauma or mundane encoding failures or forgetting mechanisms.   
Indeed, one key question is whether cases that seem to document dissociative amnesia or 
repressed memory can be explained in terms of ordinary memory mechanisms. An example is 
provided by McNally (2003) who commented on two alleged cases of dissociative/psychogenic 
amnesia in children who had witnessed a lightning strike. McNally concluded that the memory 
loss could plausibly be explained by the fact that “both amnestic youngsters had themselves been 
struck by side flashes from the main lightning bolt, knocked unconscious, and nearly killed. 
Given the serious effects on the brain of being knocked unconscious by lightning, it is little 
wonder that these two children had no memory of the event” (p. 192). The presence of a history 
of (mild) brain injury in case descriptions of patients diagnosed with dissociative amnesia has 
also been noted by other authors (Staniloiu & Markowitsch, 2014).  
Consider another example that is illustrative of many similar clinical reports. Harrison et 
al. (2017) claimed to have documented 53 cases of, as the authors preferred to call it, 
psychogenic amnesia.  These cases are cited by others as evidence for the existence of 
dissociative amnesia (Brand et al., 2018). Harrison et al. (2017) asked the amnesics several 
questions concerning their autobiographical memory. Importantly, none of these cases 
adequately satisfied the six tenets of dissociative amnesia discussed earlier. For instance amnesia 
due to neurological damage, such as “traumatic brain injury” (APA, 2013, p. 298), substance use 
or other physical causes were not ruled out, which would preclude the memory loss from being 
diagnosed in DSM-5 as dissociative amnesia. The possibility of head injury causing memory 
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impairment is particularly relevant here, especially because Harrison et al. found that a history of 
head injury was common in the “psychogenic” cases. In addition, Harrison et al. did not establish 
whether psychological shock or trauma caused the reported memory problems, neither that any 
recalled memories really were inaccessible for a period of time (see also Patihis, Otgaar, & 
Merckelbach, in press).  
Another issue is that Harrison et al. (2017) did not exclude the possibility that the 
dissociative amnesia was the result of feigning. This omission is remarkable because many of the 
patients with dissociative amnesia described by these authors were plagued by financial 
problems and it would have been relatively easy to administer symptom validity tests to them. 
With these tests, one can gauge whether patients endorse atypical or bizarre symptoms in an 
attempt to exaggerate their problems (Lilienfeld, Thames, & Watts, 2013; Peters et al., 2013). 
Other authors have found that overreporting of bizarre and implausible symptoms (e.g., “When I 
hear voices I feel as though my teeth are leaving my body”) is prevalent among those who claim 
dissociative amnesia (Cima et al., 2003). Claiming dissociative amnesia is not the same as 
suffering from it (see also Peters et al., 2013). With this consideration in mind, Staniloiu and 
Markowitsch (2014; p. 237) acknowledged in their review paper that “The main challenge posed 
by the differential diagnosis of dissociative amnesia is to distinguish between true and feigned or 
malingered amnesia.” 
Key to our argument is that the evidence that scholars put forward for dissociative 
amnesia is typically subject to more plausible explanations. McNally (2007) listed several 
alternative and perhaps more plausible interpretations of the evidence for dissociative amnesia. 
First, memory problems that emerge after trauma might be caused by everyday forgetfulness and 
should not be confused with amnesia for the trauma. Second, some dissociative amnesia theorists 
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have confused organic amnesia with dissociative amnesia. Third, people who have experienced 
trauma and are unable to recollect all of it might have failed to encode relevant parts of the 
traumatic experience. Fourth, victims of abuse commonly fail to disclose the abuse (e.g., because 
they feel ashamed), a reporting decision that should not be confused with dissociative amnesia. 
Fifth, when people cannot recollect any events (even traumatic ones) before the age of about 
three, it likely reflects the well-established phenomenon of childhood amnesia (Fivush, Haden, & 
Adam, 1995; Howe, 2013a), rather than dissociation.  Sixth and finally, victims of abuse 
understandably often do not want to think about their traumatic experiences, but often cannot 
help it due to flashbacks and intrusive memories. This phenomenon of suppression should not be 
confused with repression, and it falls well outside the domain of dissociative amnesia.  
The Purported Empirical Evidence for Repressed Memory Mechanisms  
Three main areas of research are typically used to support repressed memories or 
dissociative amnesia: retrieval inhibition, motivated forgetting, and the relation between trauma 
and dissociation. Nevertheless, none of them fully supports all six parts of the definition of either 
concept that was shown in Table 2.  
For example, the phenomenon of retrieval inhibition (Anderson & Green, 2001; 
Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014) suggests that mechanisms exist that inhibit 
some memories whereas others come to consciousness, and that trying not to think about a 
memory can make it harder to remember. However, this phenomenon does not meet the six 
tenets of dissociative amnesia such as the principle that the event is often traumatic in nature (see 
also Kihlstrom, 2002). Similarly, some research has shown limbic inhibition via the frontal 
cortex among individuals with a subtype of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that involves 
emotional suppression (Lanius et al., 2010). Although interesting, cases of PTSD involving 
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inhibited emotions do not establish that a memory is stored, that it is inaccessible due to trauma, 
and then later becomes accessible. One can inhibit one’s emotions regarding a painful memory 
while retaining a full recollection of this memory.  
Other research has shown that alleged cases of dissociative amnesia were accompanied 
by increased prefrontal cortex activity and decreased activation of the hippocampus when 
patients were exposed to stimuli (i.e., certain faces) for which they reported amnesia (Kikuchi et 
al., 2009). However, it would be premature to interpret this study as evidence for 
repressed/dissociative memories. Before concluding that dissociative amnesia is involved, it is 
imperative to rule out other possible plausible explanations, such as feigned amnesia, which was 
not investigated in this work. This is all the more remarkable because one of the patients who 
claimed to be amnesic was worried about his impending marriage, whereas the other patient had 
leave of absence from work after he had been involved in an accident. 
Retrieval inhibition has been suggested to be “a viable model for repression” (Anderson 
& Green, 2001, p. 366). The canonical paradigm used to evaluate retrieval inhibition is the 
Think/No Think paradigm (Anderson & Green, 2001). In the original version, participants see 
several unrelated word pairs (e.g., ordeal-roach). After seeing these stimuli, participants are 
presented with cue words (e.g., ordeal) and are instructed to either recall the associated word 
(think) or not (no think). When participants are asked to recall all response words during the 
presentation of cue words, no think response words are remembered less accurately. A meta-
analysis showed that No Think words were associated with lower recall rates than items that 
were studied but not asked during the think/no think phase (8% reduction; Anderson & 
Huddleston, 2012). One problem with this meta-analysis is that no unpublished studies from 
other labs were included, raising the specter of file-drawer effects and therefore inflated effect 
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sizes. In fact, Bulevich and colleagues (2006) conducted three experiments that failed to replicate 
the Think/No Think memory suppression effect and noted that “[w]hile working on this project, 
we have become aware of other groups of researchers who have failed to replicate the original 
Anderson and Green (2001) results, although most have given up and not attempted to publish 
their results” (p. 1574). Other memory researchers have recently pointed to unpublished studies 
that failed to replicate the original think/no think finding (Barnier, personal communication, 
2018; Wessel, personal communication, 2018).  
Our argument is that the following two research lines are needed in the area of the 
Think/No Think memory suppression effect. First, empirical work is necessary on the relation 
between trauma and memory suppression. To date, there is only limited work in this specific 
domain. For example, Hulbert and Anderson (2018) found that students reporting a greater 
history of trauma showed more memory suppression than did students who reported having little 
experience of trauma. Although interesting, this research does not causally establish whether 
trauma led to more memory suppression. Second, a multi-center replication attempt would yield 
critical information regarding the robustness, reliability, and potential boundary conditions of the 
Think/No Think memory suppression effect. 
Motivated forgetting of trauma-related words in the directed forgetting paradigm is 
another technique held up to support dissociative amnesia (as argued by DePrince et al., 2012; as 
part of betrayal trauma theory). For example, DePrince and Freyd (2001) argued they had 
adduced evidence for motivated forgetting in dissociated individuals. In this study, participants 
scoring low and high on the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) 
received several words (trauma-related and neutral) and after each word were instructed to 
remember or forget the word. The authors found that under divided attention conditions, 
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participants scoring high on dissociation recalled fewer trauma-related and more neutral words 
than the ones scoring low on dissociation. Still, several other researchers were unable to replicate 
these results (e.g., Devilly et al., 2007; Giesbrecht & Merckelbach, 2009; McNally, Metzger, 
Lasko, Clancy, & Pitman, 1998). In recent research, Patihis and Place (2018) found only weak 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that traumatized and dissociated individuals would forget 
trauma-related words, with only one out of eight hypotheses predicting differential motivated 
forgetting being supported. Patihis and Place pointed out the high number of “degrees of 
freedom” available to researchers to choose comparisons in such directed forgetting experiments. 
As Patihis and Place (2018, p. 630) noted, “within a given dataset, researchers can attempt to 
demonstrate differential forgetting between the To Be Remembered lists and the To Be 
Forgotten lists. If that fails they can compare trauma to positive or neutral words. If that fails 
they can look for statistical significance in several interactions—and they can make all these 
comparisons with a number of categorisations: on dissociation, trauma, diagnosis, acute stress, 
which all provide additional degrees of freedom. Given the number of possible combinations, a 
motivated researcher will likely be able to find one comparison that might be interpreted as 
motivated forgetting.”  
Even if this paradigm would consistently reveal that trauma words are remembered less 
well by dissociated individuals, it would not be evidence that a trauma can be stored and become 
both inaccessible and ultimately retrievable with accuracy. Furthermore, there is even work 
showing that directed forgetting of autobiographical memories is not significantly related to the 
emotional valence of these memories, a finding that runs counter to the expectation that trauma 
should lead to a distinctive repression effect on memory (Barnier, Conway, Mayoh, Speyer, 
Avizmil, & Harris, 2007). Despite many assertions in the literature to the contrary, directed 
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forgetting research provides no compelling evidence for repressed memories or dissociative 
amnesia. On a more general note, researchers have noted that the memory-impairing effects of 
directed forgetting may be due to a lack of rehearsal, thereby negating the need to invoke 
repressed memories (Roediger & Crowder, 1969). 
In addition, researchers have heralded the statistical correlation between trauma and 
dissociative symptoms as support for a general theory that trauma can lead to dissociative 
amnesia (see Dalenberg et al., 2012, 2014; but see Lynn et al., 2014).  However, even if this 
relation is strong—typically it is not (see Patihis & Lynn, 2017)—this does not establish 
evidence for dissociative amnesia. Dissociation, as measured by the widely used DES, assesses 
feelings of depersonalization, derealization, and memory problems. These symptoms are not 
unlikely correlates of being traumatized or stressed for a period of time. Nevertheless, the DES 
does not assess dissociative amnesia as it is defined in the DSM-5, despite the use of the word 
“dissociative.”  Specifically, the dissociative amnesia subscale of the DES (e.g., Stockdale et al., 
2002) contains items such as “finding oneself in a place, but unaware how one got there,” 
“finding oneself dressed up in clothes one can’t remember putting on,” “finding unfamiliar 
things among one’s belongings,” “not recognizing friends or family members,” and “no memory 
of some important personal events (e.g., graduation).” These items do not describe dissociative 
amnesia—they do not assess reactions to trauma and stored yet inaccessible memories. Rather, 
they might reflect poor attentive control and commonplace cognitive failures. Indeed, studies 
have found that in undergraduate samples, scores on the amnesia items of the DES correlate 
positively and significantly with a measure of poor attentive control (i.e., cognitive failures; 
Merckelbach, Muris, & Rassin, 1999: Study 1 r = .49; Study 2: r = .36; see also: Merckelbach et 
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al., 2000a, 2000b; see for replication in non-clinical groups: Bruce, Ray & Carlson, 2007; rs = 
.31–.46).  
The picture we have so far does not imply that dissociation is unrelated to memory. Our 
position is that trauma can sometimes lead to feelings of depersonalization and that, probably 
due to accompanying stress levels, memory problems might arise. However, this position does 
not speak in favor of the existence of dissociative amnesia, which implies that memories of entire 
autobiographical experiences have been temporarily inaccessible and can later be completely and 
accurately recovered (see also Patihis et al., in press). It is true that some earlier studies (e.g., 
Eich, Macaulay, Loewenstein, & Dihle, 1997) found suggestive evidence for inter-identity 
amnesia in patients with Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). However, a more recent series of 
studies by Huntjens and co-workers demonstrated the importance of distinguishing between what 
people subjectively report about their memory loss and (the absence of) objective manifestations 
of such loss. Huntjens and co-workers (2012) assessed the transfer of information between 
personality states in patients with a diagnosis of DID. Both tests of explicit and implicit memory 
were included, as well as neutral, emotional, and autobiographical information. The data across 
studies were consistent in that subjectively, DID patients reported amnesia between their 
personality states, but objectively, no evidence emerged for inter-identity amnesia (e.g., Dorahy 
& Huntjens, 2007; Huntjens, Verschuere, & McNally, 2012). 
Psychotherapeutic Techniques, Memory Distortions, and Other Side Effects 
 We now consider the role of therapy in the emergence of repressed memories. We will 
discuss research on how often therapists suggest to clients that they might have repressed 
memories, the effects of therapy on (false) memory, and the link between psychopathology and 
(false) memory recovery.  
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 Reports of Recovered Memories in Therapy. We have shown that a large percentage of 
clinical psychologists continue to believe that repressed memories might occur when people are 
faced with trauma. A pivotal point here is to know whether such beliefs bear any ramifications in 
therapeutic contexts. Patihis and Pendergrast (2019) surveyed 2,326 American citizens about 
memory recovery in psychotherapy. Nine percent (n = 217) of the sample reported that their 
therapists had discussed the possibility that they (the client) had repressed memories of 
childhood abuse. Furthermore, those participants were 20 times more likely to report recovering 
memories of abuse in therapy (that they were unaware of before therapy), compared with 
participants whose therapists did not discuss the possibility of repressed memories. Five percent 
(n = 122) of the public sample reported that in the course of therapy they had memories of being 
abused, of which they had no previous memory. Therapists who reported recovering memories 
engaged in a wide range of therapies, from attachment therapy to cognitive-behavioral therapy.  
In most therapy types, participants indicated a minority of therapists had discussed the possibility 
of repressed memories. For some therapies that involve working through past trauma, this 
occurred more frequently (e.g., attachment therapy, EMDR).  
 While Patihis and Pendergrast’s (2019) findings concerned recovered memories in the 
United States, Shaw, Leante, Ball, and Feldstad (2017) examined the frequency of repressed and 
recovered memories in the United Kingdom. They analyzed cases from the British False 
Memory Society, which is a charity that supports individuals claiming to have been falsely 
accused of a crime based on a false memory. The society database contains more than 2,500 
cases since 1993.  The researchers selected a random sample from the database and found that 
84.3% (n = 153) of daughters accusing fathers were said to have undergone a form of therapy, 
ranging from standard psychotherapy to hypnosis. Furthermore, Shaw and Vredeveldt (2019) 
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noted that the Dutch equivalent of the British False Memory Society (i.e., Werkgroep Fictieve 
Herinneringen [Fictitious Memory Group]) received 13 new possible false memory cases from 
2011 and 2018. Importantly, in 77% (n = 10) of these cases, alleged victims underwent some 
form of therapeutic intervention (EMDR, reincarnation therapy). 
In Germany, a similar false memory group called False Memory Deutschland maintains 
an archive containing cases of individuals claiming to have been falsely accused on the basis of 
recovered memories of sexual abuse. On their website3, this German group stated that at the time 
of the accusations, 83% (n = 81) of alleged victims had been receiving psychotherapy. Even 
more interesting, the number of accusations has increased since 2002. All in all, reports of 
repressed memories in therapy occur on a non-trivial scale and can be found in many different 
countries. Of course, here too, the data should be interpreted with caution as selection biases 
might play a role. Still, the data provide additional evidence that the issue of repressed memories 
has not disappeared, and there are even some indications that that it has made a resurgence, at 
least in some areas (see also below). 
 Therapy and Side Effects.  One of the most important hypotheses underlying the 
memory wars was that during psychological treatment, some therapists suggested to clients that 
they had repressed a memory of trauma, which might have engendered false memories. Although 
experimental work has confirmed that suggestive questions can elicit false memories (Scoboria 
et al., 2017), a paucity of systematic research exists on how therapy shapes memory. Goodman, 
Goldfarb, Quas, and Lyon (2017) investigated whether therapy during a child sexual abuse 
prosecution predicted memory consistency (10 to 16 years later). Interestingly, the authors found 
that therapy use positively correlated with memory consistency. Specifically, alleged victims 
                                                
3 See https://www.false-memory.de/fragebogenaktion/  
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who received therapy during or shortly after the prosecution were more likely to correctly 
remember abuse-related details (e.g., name of the perpetrator, perpetrators’ age) than those who 
did not. The use of non-suggestive psychotherapy may aid memory consistency, rather than 
hinder it. However, consistent remembering is not the same as accurate remembering (Smeets, 
Candel, & Merckelbach, 2004; Talarico & Rubin, 2003).  
Nevertheless, Goodman and colleagues (2017) did not specifically assess whether the 
type of therapy used was related to memory accuracy, and no causal conclusions concerning the 
effect of therapy on memory accuracy could be drawn from their study. Establishing a causal 
relation is important because some therapies, such as EMDR and psychoanalytic therapies, rely 
on patients retrieving specific autobiographical memories, and hence there might an increased 
risk of false memories.  Furthermore, an important issue is whether certain therapies might 
increase people’s proneness to acquiesce with suggestions and form false memories. Indeed, 
Goodman et al. argued that “a study using an experimental design with random assignment to 
groups to investigate the effects of therapeutic intervention on true and false memory for 
traumatic events would be a welcome contribution to this important field of study” (p. 929). 
Houben, Otgaar, Roelofs, and Merckelbach (2018) addressed this issue by examining the effect 
of eye movements as provided in EMDR on false memory formation (i.e., reporting of 
misinformation). Participants who received eye movement treatments were more susceptible to 
false memory creation than participants who did not receive eye movement treatments. 
Presumably, eye movements degraded memory which might make people more susceptible to 
accept external misleading information—which could result in false memories (but see also Van 
Schie & Leer, in press). So, although eye movements as in EMDR may improve memory 
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retrieval (e.g., Lyle, 2018), they might also increase people’s willingness to accept external 
suggestions.  
Besides focusing on the effects of therapy on memory performance, it is imperative to 
examine unwanted side effects of psychotherapy as reported by the therapists and patients 
themselves. Although this work is limited, research has shown that psychotherapy can in some 
cases engender negative side effects (Lilienfeld, 2007; Merckelbach, Houben, Dandachi-
Fitzgerald, Otgaar, & Roelofs, 2018; Rozental et al., 2018). Of special interest are studies that 
examined the relation between therapy and memory. For example, Rozental et al. (2016) 
surveyed participants who had been in treatment for social anxiety and found that the most 
frequently endorsed side effect of treatment was “unpleasant memories resurfaced” (n = 251; 
38%). 
Especially relevant are studies examining what happened after clients recovered 
memories via therapy.  Fetkewicz, Sharma, and Merskey (2000) noted that suicide attempts 
increased after patients received recovered memory therapy, although the absence of a 
comparison group of patients who did not receive such interventions qualifies their conclusions.  
Loftus (1997) observed a similar pattern with patients who received compensation after 
recovering memories in therapy. Before memory recovery, 3 (10%) reported thinking about 
committing suicide whereas after recovery, 20 (67%) reported being suicidal. Of course, it 
cannot be concluded that this specific therapy caused these suicide attempts or feelings, but it is 
concerning that patients can become more symptomatic after such therapeutic interventions. 
Collectively, research on the negative side effects of therapy, although limited in quantity, 
suggests that negative effects of therapy may not be negligible and that memory recovery may 
play a role in deterioration.  
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Psychopathology and False Memory. Another way to examine the role of therapy in the 
reported unearthing of repressed memories is to determine whether people with some form of 
psychopathology are at higher risk for false memories than are people without psychopathology. 
This information is vital because people might seek an explanation for their disorder in therapy 
(cf. “effort after meaning,” Bartlett, 1923), and therapists might actively search for such 
explanations in patients’ memories and thereby create a springboard for false memories. Authors 
have voiced differing opinions with regard to the relation between psychopathology and false 
memory generation. For example, Bookbinder and Brainerd (2016, p. 1345) stated that “[w]ith 
respect to PTSD especially, available data do not provide a consistent picture of false memory 
effects.” In contrast, Scoboria and colleagues (2017, p. 160) opined that “people struggling with 
psychopathology who seek help for their symptoms may be particularly vulnerable to 
suggestions.”  
Otgaar, Muris, Howe, and Merckelbach (2017) recently reviewed the body of empirical 
work related to psychopathology and false memory creation. Specifically, they focused on false 
memory effects in people with PTSD, depression, and a history of trauma and found that in most 
of these studies, researchers used the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory 
paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In this paradigm, participants receive 
word lists containing associatively-related words (e.g., night, pillow, moon). During recall and 
recognition tasks, participants frequently misremember a related, but not presented word called 
the critical lure (in this case, sleep). Otgaar and colleagues also included experiments that relied 
on emotionally charged word lists related to some aspects of the participants’ psychopathology. 
For example, for patients with depression, lists could be used that focused on “sad.” The general 
finding from the review was that people with PTSD, depression, or a history of trauma were at 
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increased risk of forming false memories when they received word lists linked to their symptoms 
(also see Howe & Malone, 2011). There is good evidence that certain forms of psychopathology 
(e.g., schizophrenia) go hand in hand with a tendency to accept and give in to external pressure 
(Peters, Moritz, Tekin, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2012). More importantly, existing work also 
indicates that psychopathology (i.e., depression, PTSD) is linked to an enhanced propensity to 
produce spontaneous false memories.   
The implications of this review should be drawn with care, however, as spontaneous false 
memories as induced by the DRM paradigm are typically weakly or even unrelated to false 
memories induced by suggestion (e.g., Bernstein, Scoboria, Desjarlais, & Soucie, 2018; Calado, 
Otgaar, & Muris, in press; Nichols & Loftus, in press; Ost, Blank, Davies, Jones, Lambert, & 
Salmon, 2013; Otgaar & Candel, 2011; Patihis, Frenda, & Loftus, 2018; Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, 
& Dong, 2013). So, although psychopathology seems to be related to an increased vulnerability 
for spontaneous false memory production, this does not necessarily imply that it is also linked to 
an increased susceptibility to suggestion-induced false memories.  
The Creation of Implanted False Memories 
 Many battles of the memory wars revolved around the issue of therapists who informed 
patients that they had repressed memories of childhood. The fact that some therapists suggested 
to patients that they had been sexually abused raised concerns regarding false memories in 
psychotherapy (Loftus, 1994) as well as whether suggestive therapeutic interventions could fuel 
false memory formation. Based on cases in which recovered memories surfaced, researchers 
began to examine the conditions, such as the types of events suggested, under which false events 
could be inadvertently implanted in memory. Specifically, a question that was addressed was 
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whether false events could be implanted and whether even emotionally-negative false memories 
could be formed. 
 False Events and Implanted False Memories.  Researchers have used the false memory 
implantation paradigm to demonstrate that entire events, ranging from positive (e.g., birthday 
party) to negative (e.g., getting lost in a shopping mall), can be implanted. In the false memory 
implantation paradigm (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), participants are asked what they can remember 
about a true experienced event and a false event. Participants are (falsely) told that their parents 
confirmed that these events were experienced by the participants. During multiple suggestive 
interviews, about 30% of participants claim to remember the false event (Scoboria et al., 2017). 
Studies that have successfully implanted negative events bear special relevance to the claim that 
recovered memories of abuse may be instances of rich false memories. 
For example, Hyman, Husband, and Billings (1995) found in their implantation study that 
at the second suggestive interview 10% (n = 2) of their subjects falsely remembered that they 
spent a night at the hospital because of high fever and an ear infection. Loftus and Pickrell 
(1995) showed that 25% (n = 6) of their sample created false memories of being lost in a 
shopping mall. Porter, Yuille, and Lehman (1999) implanted several negative events (i.e., getting 
lost, serious medical procedure, getting seriously hurt by a child, animal attack, indoor accident), 
and percentages of implantation ranged from 16.7% (n = 3; getting lost) to 36.8% (n = 7; animal 
attack). Shaw and Porter (2015) found that 70% (n = 21) of participants formed false memories 
of committing a crime (but see Wade, Garry, and Pezdek, 2018, who used another scoring 
method and reported that only 26-30% of Shaw and Porter’s formed false memories).  
Of course, the events that have been implanted in experimental studies on false memories 
differ in various ways from recollected events in real cases (e.g., sexual abuse), which almost 
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always involve feelings of shame and taboo (Goodman, Quas, & Ogle, 2010). Indeed, when 
Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge (1997) attempted to implant an experience of a rectal enema in adult 
participants, none of them fell prey to the suggestion.  However, this is not to say that such 
events cannot be implanted in memory. Otgaar, Candel, Scoboria, and Merckelbach (2010) 
found that at the second interview, six children (10%) falsely reported having received a rectal 
enema (see also Hart & Schooler, 2006). Furthermore, in general, research suggests that negative 
events are more likely to be misremembered than are more mundane events (e.g., Otgaar, 
Candel, & Merckelbach, 2008; Porter, Taylor, & ten Brinke, 2008). This finding has been 
explained by the fact that because emotionally-negative memories contain a high level of 
connectivity with other memories, it is relatively easy to activate and then remember events that 
were not experienced but related to the experienced event (e.g., Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016; 
Otgaar et al., 2017).  
Although one could argue that the type of events implanted in false memory research do 
not match events of interest in legal cases, in false memory implantation studies, participants are 
generally interviewed two or three times in a suggestive fashion, whereas legal cases often drive 
home the point that people with false memories received suggestive interviews by therapists over 
the course of years (Maran, 2010; van Til, 1997).  It seems safe to assume that with enough 
suggestive pressure, even extreme negative events may be implantable in memory.  
Estimating the Prevalence of False Memory Implantation. Researchers have tried to 
estimate the percentage of individuals who develop false autobiographical memories in the 
laboratory. Such experiments have mainly involved healthy undergraduate students who are 
confronted with suggestive information after which their memory reports are evaluated for 
indications of acceptance of false information. Attempting to come up with an accurate estimate 
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is, however, a daunting task as studies differ in terms of coding and criteria for defining a report 
a false memory. Brewin and Andrews (2017) reviewed false memory implantation studies and 
concluded that in 15% of the recollective experiences induced by the implantation method, 
statements were rated as full-blown false memories. They argued that this statistic shows that 
“susceptibility to false memories of childhood events appears more limited than has been 
suggested” (p. 2).  
Nevertheless, Brewin and Andrew’s (2017) review has been criticized (for a critical 
analysis, Otgaar, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Smeets, 2017). First, as mentioned previously, the 
coding of false memories varied among false memory implantation studies. Therefore, Scoboria 
and colleagues (2017) devised a new coding system based on theories concerning remembering 
(e.g., Brewer, 1996; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; 
Rubin, 2006). Using this system, they recoded transcripts from eight published false memory 
implantation studies. Overall, they found that 30.4% of transcripts were coded as false memories, 
which is twice the percentage that Brewin and Andrews (2017) reported. Also, in Scoboria et 
al.’s analysis, an additional 23% of cases were coded as having accepted the false event to some 
extent.  
Second, Otgaar et al. (2017) reviewed 15 false memory laboratory studies that 
investigated the confidence that participants place in their false memories. The data revealed a 
mean confidence rating of 74% [unweighted 95% CI (0.66, 0.78)].4 Furthermore, in 93% (k = 14) 
of the studies, false memory reports had confidence ratings exceeding the midpoint of the rating 
scale. Clearly, confidence is often high in implanted false memories. 
                                                
4 In the reviewed studies, confidence was measured using different rating scales (e.g., 1-5, 1-10, 
50-100%). 
RETURN OF THE REPRESSED  36 
 
 
Third, even if we accept the highly conservative 15% as a fair estimate of overall false 
memory potential, this percentage still points to a significant problem in legal and therapeutic 
settings.  It means that if a therapist using suggestive prompts would consult with 100 patients, 
on average, 15 of them might develop illusory autobiographical memories of, for example, 
sexual abuse, and some might falsely accuse an innocent person because of this memory (Nash, 
Wade, Garry, Loftus, & Ost, 2017; see also Smeets, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Otgaar, 2017). 
Memory Wars in the Courtroom and Beyond 
We have reviewed several lines of evidence showing that the topic of repressed memories 
continues to be popular although scientifically controversial among psychologists and 
psychiatrists. We will now examine the role of repressed memories and dissociative amnesia in 
legal cases and the persistence of naïve memory beliefs in the courtroom.  
 Repressed Memories and Dissociative Amnesia in the Courtroom. In 2017, a French 
ministerial report was published proposing to increase the statute of limitations for prosecuting 
sexual abuse from 20 to 30 years (Flament & Calmettes, 2017). The reason given was that 
because victims often delay disclosing their abusive experience (e.g., Goodman, Brown et al., 
2013; see also Connolly & Read, 2006), they are still entitled to have their day in court. 
However, a more controversial reason for increasing the statute of limitations given in the report 
was that traumatic experiences of abuse could lead to dissociative amnesia (Dodier & Thomas, 
2018). Dodier and Thomas rightly noted that the use of such controversial term in an official 
governmental report might lead people with a history of trauma to believe that their traumatic 
memories are atypical and that to uncover additional memories, they should rely on methods 
such as recovered memory therapy that might result in false memories. Admittedly, victims 
might take many years to disclose their traumatic experiences, but as noted before, there are 
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more plausible explanations than dissociative amnesia for the delay in reporting the abuse, such 
as feeling ashamed of the trauma and re-interpretation of the experience as abusive (e.g., 
Goodman-Brown, Edelstein, Goodman, Jones, & Gordon, 2003; Schooler, 2001). This issue of 
delayed disclosure is especially relevant to stress, as there is currently much attention regarding 
historic sexual abuse cases, such as those that emerged in the #MeToo discussion, of which the 
overwhelming majority has nothing to do with memory repression or recovery (see also 
Goodman et al. 2017). 
There is evidence of recovered memories entering into some cases in Britain, too. The 
UK Advocates Gateway (2015) document on trauma explains to lawyers how to approach 
traumatized witnesses and victims. It stipulates that dissociative amnesia is possible and argues 
that “Trauma disrupts the left hemisphere function of the brain (...). This disruption affects the 
ability to give a verbal narrative (...). The right hemisphere of the brain stores implicit or sensory 
associated memories.” This is questionable advice, with some potentially unsupported and 
pseudoscientific ideas mixed into the document. 
 An alternative way to examine whether the issue of repressed memories and dissociative 
amnesia is still prominent in the legal arena is to examine court proceedings and investigate the 
number of cases in which repressed memories played a role. In the Netherlands, an online 
database of court rulings (http://www.rechtspraak.nl) exists in which one can search for key 
terms in a diverse set of cases. The database is not exhaustive, as it only lists the most prominent 
court rulings. We used the search term “verdringing” (in English, “repression”) in the period 
1990–2018 and investigated criminal trials in which repressed memories were mentioned. Figure 
1 demonstrates that cases in which the term “repression” was used referring to cases on repressed 
memories have increased over the past years. When a similar exercise was performed using the 
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search term “hervonden herinnering” (in English, “recovered memory”), a similar pattern 
emerged.  Moreover, when we used the term “dissociatieve amnesia” (in English, “dissociative 
amnesia”), again, we found that this term is on the rise.5  
Caution should be exerted when interpreting these data. First, it is remarkable that 
virtually no legal cases were found on repression and recovered memory in the period 1990–
2000. One reason might be that such older cases are not represented in this database. Second, 
although issues such as repressed and recovered memories were discussed in these criminal trials 
summarized by pertinent court rulings thereafter, judges did not necessarily accept these notions 
uncritically. Nonetheless, these data demonstrate that, at least in the Netherlands, legal 
professionals still use the Freudian and neo-Freudian nomenclature of repression and dissociative 
amnesia.  
 
 
Figure 1. Number of Dutch legal cases mentioning repression from 1990-2018 (1990-2000: 1 
case; 2001-2010: 13 cases; 2011-2018: 19 cases), recovered memory from 1990-2018 (1990-
                                                
5 We explored whether the rise of these terms is also evident when controlling for the total 
number of cases in the Dutch legal database. In the period 2001-2010, there was a total of 
192345 cases and in the period 2011-2018 there was a total of 267377 cases. Even if these base 
rates were taken into account, we found that the terms recovered memory (9 x 10-5 to 1.2 x 10-4) 
and dissociative amnesia (7 x 10-5 to 1 x 10-4) increased from 2001-2010 to 2011-2018.   
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2000: zero cases; 2001-2010: 18 cases; 2011-2018: 32 cases), or dissociative amnesia from 
1990-2018 (1990-2000: zero cases; 2001-2010: 14 cases; 2011-2018: 27 cases).  
Memory Beliefs in the Courtroom. Although we have discussed naïve beliefs about 
memory across a variety of lay and professional populations, these beliefs can be especially 
problematic in the courtroom.  Because judicial outcomes may be influenced by the naïve beliefs 
about memory that triers-of-fact harbor, it is critical that when testimony consists mainly of 
memory evidence (e.g., remembering event details, identifying the perpetrator), actors in the 
legal domain possess a scientifically informed view of how memory works.  
To appreciate how the disconnect between the science of memory and the beliefs held by 
individuals in the legal arena can lead to unsafe convictions, one can examine the cases listed on 
the Innocence Project websites in the USA6  and the UK7. The most common factor in these false 
convictions has been faulty memory evidence (i.e., incorrect eyewitness identifications are 
implicated in more than 70% of cases). Apparently, police and prosecutors made decisions about 
this memory evidence perhaps without exactly understanding the science of how memory works 
and often because other more objective evidence was lacking (for reviews, see Howe & Knott, 
2015; Howe, Knott, & Conway, 2018).  
Judges and prosecutors alike differ as to whether they will accept expert memory 
testimony.  For example, in a Dutch revision case in which dissociative memories of abuse were 
the central issue, one senior prosecutor gave as his opinion that in contrast to DNA experts, 
psychological experts do not aid judges in helping them to understand the intricacies of 
statements by witnesses or defendants8. He added that the field of legal psychology is known for 
                                                
6 http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
7 http://www.innocencenetwork.org.uk/ 
8 Case number: ECLI:NL: PHR:2015:2769 
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its lack of consensus and for its high degree of subjectivity, which is an hyperbole when one 
looks at the generally broad consensus on a range of topics found in surveys among legal 
psychologists (Kassin et al., 2001; Kassin, Redlich, Alceste, & Luke, 2018).  Furthermore, 
research clearly indicates that judges routinely overestimate jurors’ ability to understand and 
correctly use memory evidence when in fact it is solely based on their “common sense” such as 
that memory works as a video camera (e.g., Houston, Hope, Memon, & Read, 2013; Magnussen, 
Melinder, Stridbeck, & Raja, 2010; see also the Scooter Libby effect: Kassam et al., 2009). 
 The question of whether jurors’ common-sense views of memory in court are adequate 
also extends to cases in which adults are recollecting events that happened decades earlier in 
childhood.  Like elsewhere, it is not a given that judges will necessarily accept scientific expert 
testimony about memory in their courtroom to counteract the commonsense views held by jurors 
and others involved in the judicial system.  Progress has been made in some U.S. states in which 
judges in trials involving eyewitness identification must now present jurors with cautions about 
the reliability of such evidence prior to their deliberation9. In Pennsylvania, Elizabeth Loftus and 
her colleagues drafted jury instructions that addressed issues concerning a broad spectrum of 
expert memory testimony10. Similarly, in the UK, judges are now obliged to give juries so called 
Turnbull guidelines in the cases that heavily rest on eyewitness identification11. Admittedly, 
these are but a few recent examples, and much more research needs to be conducted to 
counteract the impact of erroneous lay beliefs about memory in the courtroom.  
                                                
 
9 See: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/nj-supreme-court/1578475.html 
10 See: http://www.dauphincounty.org/document_center/courtdepartments/judges/Model-
Eyewitness-Identification-Jury-Instructions.pdf  
11 https://www.inbrief.co.uk/court-proceedings/turnbull-guidelines/  
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Furthermore, it is also imperative that such guidelines are not fixed but are provisional 
and can be updated any time. Ideally, guidelines are based on the current corpus of scientific 
findings, but new findings might warrant amendments. For example, previous research suggested 
that the confidence that eyewitnesses place in their eyewitness identification is only weakly 
related to their accuracy. In contrast, recent research has demonstrated that under optimal 
conditions, confidence is strongly predictive of accuracy (Sauerland & Sporer, 2009; Wixted & 
Wells, 2017). It is important to be cognizant about such new developments.  
Memory Wars in the Scientific Literature. One might posit that although the 
controversial issue of repressed memories is still relevant in clinical and legal contexts, the 
debate concerning repressed memories is now muted in the scientific literature. There are two 
indications that this is not the case. First, a recent bibliometric analysis examined the number of 
publications and citations regarding repressed and recovered memories from 2001–2018 (Dodier, 
in press). The author found that proponents and opponents of repressed memories have continued 
to publish about repressed and recovered memories throughout the time period. Notably, these 
articles were cited just as often as articles published during the presumed heyday of the memory 
wars in the 1990’s.  Also, the year 2018 witnessed an increase in publications on this topic. This 
increase was characterized by a mix of articles in favor or against the concept of repressed 
memories. Specifically, of the 16 articles in 2018, 5 (31%) were largely or entirely in favor of the 
existence of repressed memories whereas 9 (56%) articles expressed skepticism regarding the 
existence of repressed memories (2 articles adopted a neutral position). 
 Second, the debate over repressed memories and dissociative amnesia has hardly 
vanished from the scientific literature. For example, Brand, Schielke, and Brams (2017a, b) 
recently tried to provide legal professionals with evidence-based knowledge on trauma-related 
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dissociation and concomitant effects such as dissociative amnesia. Their papers provoked a 
disagreement between them and memory researchers who argued that Brand et al.’s conclusions 
were not evidence-based and potentially hazardous (Brand et al., 2018; Merckelbach & Patihis, 
2018; Patihis et al., in press). Clearly, debates relating to the issue of dissociative amnesia, 
repressed memories, or both, are alive and well in the scientific literature (see also Staniloiu & 
Markowitsch, 2014).    
 
Conclusion 
 The claims of some authors to the contrary, the controversial topic of repressed memories 
and dissociative amnesia continues to be very much alive in clinical, legal, and academic 
contexts. Converging lines of evidence suggest that concerns regarding the widespread belief in 
repressed memories are far from having been resolved following the memory wars of the 1990’s. 
Across many different professionals (e.g., psychotherapists), the percentage who believe in 
repressed memories remains high, generally above 50%. Furthermore, the idea of repressed 
memories has merely become popular under a different name—dissociative amnesia—which 
shares many characteristics with repressed memory and that carries the added cachet of being 
associated with the American Psychiatric Association’s (2013) diagnostic manual. Also, research 
points to the possibility that some therapeutic techniques exert adverse effects by potentially 
increasing the likelihood of false memories. Finally, questions of repressed memories continue to 
be addressed in the courtroom and in the scientific literature. Taken together, these different 
threads of evidence imply that false recovered memories of abuse continue to pose a substantial 
risk in therapeutic settings, potentially leading to false accusations and associated miscarriages of 
justice.  
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A relevant question is how flawed ideas regarding the functioning of memory could be 
corrected. That unconscious repressed memory is still accepted with little qualification and 
remains popular among many mental health professionals can be explained in part by the now 
well-replicated finding that it is typically difficult to correct erroneous beliefs. Specifically, when 
people are confronted with any form of misinformation (e.g., fake news), correcting such errors 
is challenging, a phenomenon referred to as the continued influence effect (Lewandowsky, 
Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012; see also Lilienfeld, Marshall, Todd, & Shane, 2015) or 
belief perseverance (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980). However, recent studies suggest that 
informing people that their firmly held beliefs are incorrect (“prebunking”), and even providing 
them with the correct alternative information (debunking), can often be effective in correcting 
these beliefs (e.g., Blank & Launay, 2014; Crozier & Strange, in press). Besides applying these 
provisional but promising methods, it is crucially important to educate individuals, especially 
legal professionals and clinicians, about the science of memory. This effort is all the more 
essential given that these professionals are often in close contact with victims, patients, 
witnesses, and suspects. Such interactions are a prime opportunity for inadvertent memory 
contamination. Increasing their awareness of potentially harmful beliefs about repressed 
memories should therefore be a priority in clinical and legal work, as well as a priority for 
psychological scientists at large.  
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Table 1 
Percentages of People Believing in the Concept of Repressed Memory Among Various Studies 
Study Total N  Percentage Statement Scale Country  
Clinical Psychologists    
Yapko (1994a) 869 59% “Events that we know occurred but can’t 
remember are repressed memories” 
Agree-Disagree United States 
Dammeyer et al. (1997) 111 58%* “Do you believe that repressed memory exists? 1= definitely no, 10 = 
definitely yes 
United States 
Dammeyer et al. (1997) 105 71% “Do you believe that repressed memory exists? 1= definitely no, 10 = 
definitely yes 
United States 
Dammeyer et al. (1997) 75 60% “Do you believe that repressed memory exists? 1= definitely no, 10 = 
definitely yes 
United States 
Merckelbach and Wessel 
(1998) 
27 96% “Repression exist” Yes, no, don’t know The Netherlands 
Magnussen and Melinder 
(2012) 
858 63% “Sometimes adults in psychotherapy remember 
traumatic events from early childhood, about 
which they previously had absolutely no 
recollection. Do you think such memories are real 
or false?” 
All are real, most are real, 
most are false, all are false-
uncertain 
Norway 
Kemp et al. (2013) 375 89% “Can memories for childhood trauma (i.e., sexual 
abuse) be “blocked out” from conscious memory 
for many years?” 
Yes but rare, don’t know, no 
don’t believe this 
England and Wales 
Patihis et al. (2014) 58 60.3%! “Traumatic memories are often repressed” Strongly disagree, disagree, 
slightly disagree, slightly 
agree, agree, and strongly 
agree  
United States 
Patihis et al. (2014) 82 69.1% “Traumatic memories are often repressed” Strongly disagree, disagree, 
slightly disagree, slightly 
agree, agree, and strongly 
agree  
United States 
Kagee and Breet (2015) 
 
103 75.7% “Individuals commonly repress the memories of 
traumatic experiences” 
Definitely untrue, probably 
untrue, probably true, 
definitely true 
South-African 
Ost et al. (2017) 125 69.6% “The mind is capable of unconsciously “blocking 
out” 
memories of traumatic events” 
1= strongly disagree, 4= 
strongly agree 
United Kingdom 
Wessel (2018) 492 93% “It is possible that access to trauma memory is 
blocked”** 
Agree, disagree, no opinion The Netherlands 
Other Professionals    
RETURN OF THE REPRESSED  67 
 
 
Benton et al. (2006) 111 73% “Traumatic experiences can be repressed for many 
years for many years and then recovered” 
Generally true, generally 
false, I don’t know 
United States 
Benton et al. (2006) 42 50% “Traumatic experiences can be repressed for many 
years for many years and then recovered” 
Generally true, generally 
false, I don’t know 
United States 
Benton et al. (2006) 52 65% “Traumatic experiences can be repressed for many 
years for many years and then recovered” 
Generally true, generally 
false, I don’t know 
United States 
Odinot et al. (2015) 143 75.7% “Traumatic experiences can be repressed for many 
years for many years and then recovered”*** 
Agree, disagree The Netherlands 
Erens et al. (2019) 158 84% “Traumatic memories are often repressed because 
of their painful content” 
Agree, disagree The Netherlands 
Laypersons    
Merckelbach and Wessel 
(1998) 
50 94% “Repression exist” Yes, no, don’t know The Netherlands 
Magnussen et al. (2006) 2000 45% “Sometimes adults in psychotherapy remember 
traumatic events 
from early childhood, about which they previously 
had absolutely 
no recollection. Do you think such memories are 
real or false?” 
All are real, most are real, 
most are false, all are false-
uncertain 
Norway 
Magnussen et al. (2006) 2000 40% “Sometimes adults in psychotherapy remember 
traumatic events 
from early childhood, about which they previously 
had absolutely 
no recollection. Do you think such memories are 
real or false?” 
All are real, most are real, 
most are false, all are false-
uncertain 
Norway 
Patihis et al. (2014) 390 81% “Traumatic memories are often repressed” Strongly disagree, disagree, 
slightly disagree, slightly 
agree, agree, and strongly 
agree  
United States 
Note.* percentages refer to people scoring 8, 9, or 10, ! percentages refer to people who chose slightly agree, agree, strongly agree, **Dutch version = “goed mogelijk dat toegang tot 
traumaherinnering is geblokkeerd”, ***Dutch version: “Traumatische ervaringen kunnen jarenlang worden verdrongen (d.w.z. geheel vergeten zijn) en dan toch nog worden hervonden     
 
 
 
 
